SHARI’ATE ACCOUNTING:

AN ETHICAL CONSTRUCTION OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE

Triyuwono, Iwan and M.Gaffikin

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Abstract

Accounting (knowledge) is one of the important means of reflecting reality, as different surfaces (values) will reflect different realities. When a reality has been socially constructed based on ethical values - Shari’ate (Islamic) values, there is a need, in order to reflect the same reality, for conceptualising and constructing accounting knowledge based on the same values. Predicated upon this view, this study in essence attempts to elaborate critically the ethical construction of accounting knowledge by sharing Shari’ate ideas on self’s perception of ethics, human nature (self) and society, and the ontology and epistemology of knowledge. By doing so, Shari’ate accounting knowledge not only can reflect the reality in an accurate manner, but also can assist in creating social reality ethically. Islamic methodology of knowledge ... must not be viewed as a negation of Western .legacy of learning. Rather it ought to be viewed as a much more broad and comprehensive methodology in which the materialistic methodology of empirical certification is merely a part (Bashir 1986b).

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1. Introduction

Ethics has recently become an interesting topic in the accounting arena (see, for example, Francis 1990; Alam 1991; Gambling and Karim 1991; Chua and Degeling 1993; Schweiker 1993). Various writers, in essence, argue that ethics should be cohesively implanted in accounting practices, because ethics clearly signal and distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, and justice from injustice; thus, the importance of its presence in accounting is primarily in its real effects on the life of individuals in society. It was argued by Chua and Degeling (1993, 292) that "[accounting’s] rules not only influence how numbers are recorded in books of account but they help to change the ways in which people see, think, talk and relate to others" (see also Morgan 1988). Taking the same position, Francis (1990, 7) articulates that "[a]ccounting ... is a practice grounded in moral discernment." This means that the involvement of a moral agent, that is, the accountant, is crucial to the extent that he or she, through accounting, "can influence the lived experience of others in ways which cause that experience to differ from what it would be in the absence of accounting, or in the presence of an alternative kind of accounting" (Francis 1990, 7).

From another point of view, Dillard (1991) argues that accounting is a "technology." However, what he means by technology is not that which is commonly encountered and interpreted in a functionalist view, rather ... it is a technology that is not ideologically sterile. The "axioms, laws, etc." are not based on observed phenomenon, as purportedly is the case in the physical sciences, but emanate from the social sphere. For accounting, in spite of its apparent objectivity, there are no "physical absolutes" upon which to base, and verify, the technology. The framework is a social construction. The technology is framed by ideology. The interpretation of events, and even the specification of what constitutes an event, are functions of the socio-political point of view (Dillard 1991, 9).

The point of the statement is that accounting is not value-free; it is a social construction which develops and changes in the social sphere. Or in other words, the appearance of accounting is greatly influenced by the values in which it socially grows and is practiced.

From this statement, we can see two implicit value-based elements that shape the appearance of accounting, that is, the reality that would be reflected and accounted for (Davis et al. 1982; Morgan 1988; Dillard 1991), and the means that would be utilised to mirror the reality. Our perception of reality, as illustrated by Dillard (1991, 9), is like gazing into a mirror; the reality that we can capture is "what is reflected back to us." And, of course, the appearance of the reflected reality depends upon the surface of the mirror; because, as he argued, "[d]ifferent surfaces (ideological frames [values])reflect a different reality (Dillard 1991, 9; italics added)." Dillard (1991) goes on to argue that the output from accounting, which is determined by societal values, is projected onto the mirrors (also framed by the values) and its distortions are interpreted as "objective" representations of the realities or phenomena; the interpretations then become the resources for (re)shaping the realities, that is, both the mirror (the accounting) and the reality that would be reflected by accounting (Morgan 1988).

We see here that accounting (knowledge) is one of the important means of reflecting reality in that different surfaces (values) will reflect different realities. And we have to remember as well in this context that when reality has been perceived as ethically conceptualised and constructed, then it should be reflected by an appropriate means, that is, accounting which is also conceptualised and constructed based on ethical values. If it is not, accounting will reflect reality in other forms of appearance. Predicated upon this view, this study in essence attempts to elaborate critically the ethical construction of accounting knowledge by sharing Shari’ate (Islamic) ideas on self’s perception of ethics, human nature (self) and society, and the ontology and epistemology of knowledge.

2.Self’s Perception of Ethics

In the view of symbolic interactionists, self is the important element of the dynamic pattern of an individual (see Mead 1934, Blumer 1969, Charon 1979). Self is not a static being, rather it is always a dynamic one (Blumer 1969) which constantly experiences complicated social interactions which produces certain characteristics.

Having experienced the interaction, the self may internalise social values that exist in a society, and may or may not accept those values. When, for instance, an individual has internalised and accepted mainstream values of a society, he or she will actualise his or her covert (thinking) and overt action based on the perspective of those values. Some accountants or accounting researchers, for example, have constructed, shaped, and applied accounting (knowledge) based on the values and perceptions that individuals and firms possess a single goal of utility-maximisation (Chua 1986); while other accountants or researchers may take such actions based on their feelings that have a responsibility or a duty to maintain or create harmony in life (see, for example, Cottell and Perlin 1990; Riahi-Belkaoui 1992).

Obviously, values are the departing point from which the individuals act. By virtue of �this, the individual may take action based on the values that he or she perceives and �believes in. The action that has been brought forth is real in its consequences and it �may become reality in the shadow of those values. Hence, looking at this, different �values may reflect and create different realities. By values we mean no more than �ethics; it is the basis of right-wrong or good-wicked considerations for the individual �before embarking on a course of action. The ethics may be grounded in the view that: �(a) "an agent has a choice between courses of action (or inaction) the right act is that �which will produce the most happiness [utility], not just for the agent himself but for all �who are in any way affected" (Mackie 1977, 125), that is, utilitarianism; or (b) in the �sense that an ethical system is not built round "the notion of some goal that is to be �attained but rather round the notions of rules or principles of action or duties or rights �or virtues, or some combination of these" (Mackie 1977, 149), that is, a deontological �system; or � it is based on religion. In the accounting arena, and in particular the �accounting profession, deontologism is commonly utilised as the basis for setting the �professional code of ethics (Cottell and Perlin 1990, 29; Riahi-Belkaoui 1992, 30), �while accounting knowledge, especially mainstream accounting both in the sense of �accounting research and theory building in general, makes use of utilitarianism, as �identified by Chua (1986).

However, it is possible that accounting is not shaped by the values based on �utilitarianism and deontologism, but is inspired by Shari’ate ethics, the Islamic ethics. �With regard to this, Bin Ashari and Bin Mohamed (1989), Alam (1991), Gambling and �Karim (1991), Hamid et al. (1993), Baydoun and Willett (1994), for instance, have �attempted to blend ethics with their works. This is so since individuals have �internalised Shari’ate values and, with their own intentions or objectives, have �attempted to externalise the values in the form of developing accounting thought. In �the Islamic world, some other contemporary disciplines, such as anthropology, art and �architecture, economics, history, law, linguistics, philosophy of science, psychology, �sociology, and so forth (see IIIT 1988; 1989), are also inspired by Shari’ah. �Interestingly, in the context of economics Arif (1985) asserts that Islamic economics is �constructed on and shaped by the values of Shari’ah; he even states that Islamic �economics is built on the Shari’ah paradigm. In a Muslim society, according to Arif, a �representative economic agent of the Islamic economic system is the Muslim man or �woman, not the economic man or woman as perceived by capitalism. A Muslim has �the perception that his or her purpose in life is to achieve falah, namely, the attainment �of the pleasure of God, while the economic individual perceives him or herself as �having a limited perspective of life which confines him or her merely to the �maximisation of utility; thus, rationality and the criteria of success are based on this �measure. In contrast, the criterion for success for a Muslim is following and adhering �to the Shari’ah to achieve the falah. If, for instance, the Shari’ah asks the Muslim to �be moderate, his or her Islamic rationality will drive him or her to be moderate and not �to be selfish (see Arif 1985). Predicated upon this philosophic notion about the �essential nature of a Muslim, Arif (1985) articulates that the Shari’ah paradigm is the �beginning of a scientific revolution in Islamic economics which stands apart from the �previous paradigms of Mercantilist, Physiocrats, Classical, Neo-classical, Marxian, �Keynesian, and the Neo-classical counter revolution.

This illustration convinces us that an individual, because of his or her self, is always in �a dynamic pattern stimulating any changes the character of which is greatly driven by �the values of "ideology" that have been perceived and internalised through thoughts, �actions and social interactions with which he or she lives.

3.Shari’ate View of the Nature of Human (Self) and Society, and Their Interrelationship

Burrell and Morgan (1979), in their set of assumptions concerning human nature, point �out that social scientists view human beings in two extreme natures, that is, voluntarism �and determinism. The former refers to the view that the nature of an individual is �completely autonomous and free-willed, while the latter denotes a contrasting vision �which sees an individual and all his or her activities as being definitely determined by �the situations in which he or she lives. This set of assumptions is, among others, the �factor that reflects a certain perspective of social sciences. When an individual, for �example, perceives him or herself as a passive agent who is unable to create his or her �own social world, he or she will see it objectively as a concrete structure, as if the social �world has been constructed and he or she enters and lives within it. This view results �in the epistemology of positivism which stresses the empirical analysis of concrete �relationships in the external social world (Morgan and Smircich 1980). Under this �view, hypothetico-deductive accounts of scientific explanations, and quantitative �methods of data collection and analysis to generalise theory are accepted (Chua 1986), �while the perception of the active agent generates social sciences which characterise the �use of historic and ethnographic research, case studies and participation observation to �attain scientific, temporal, and contextual explanations of human intention (Chua �1986), and of social reality.

Having viewed the importance of the perception of human nature, we would like to draw attention to some Islamic insights. In ghtis respect, Shari’ati (1979) argues that �human beings are not only the viceregents of God, but are also the keepers of God’s �trust. In all conscience, the trust, as interpreted by Shari’ati (1979) and Ali (1989), is �"free will." Ali (1989) in this respect elaborates that free will is only possessed by �human beings; the heavens and the universe do not have any (free) will of their own; �they obey the will of God absolutely. In a more expressive illustration, Shari’ati �clarifies this by stating:

[man] is the only being able to act counter to his own instinctual nature, something �no animal or plant can do. For example, you will never encounter an animal �voluntarily engaging in a two-day fast, or a plant committing suicide out of grief. �Plants and animals can neither render great services nor commit treachery. It is not �possible for them to act in a way different from that in which they have been created. �It is only man who can rebel against the way in which he was created, who can defy �even his spiritual or bodily needs, and act against the dictates of goodness and virtue. �He can act either in accordance with his intelligence or in opposition to it. He is free �to be good or to be evil, to resemble mud or to resemble God. Will is, then, the �greatest property of man, and the affinity between God and man is apparent from �this fact (1979, 76).

Of course, the degree of free will is not absolute, since absolute freedom belongs to God only (Nasr 1994). However, when the individual has actualised his or her free will - to be good or to be evil, to resemble mud or to resemble God, he or she must be �responsible for his or her choice (al-Faruqi 1992). For al-Faruqi (1992, 101), responsibility is an implication of faith (tawhid, the belief in the oneness of God) for society. According to him, every individual carries his or her �own burden in full consciousness which also means that it is the consequence of �accepting the trust which is entrusted by God to the individual. Responsibility, within �which its values are implanted in the inner consciousness of, and experienced by, the �individual, is apparently "the essence of morality [ethics], for wherever it is absent, no �deed can have moral value, and the higher, greater part of the divine will will not be �realized" (al-Faruqi 1992, 101); whereas, the mission of Muslim society, the ummat, is �to realise the Divine Will (al-Faruqi 1992, 91). So important is morality for Muslim �society, that al Faruqi (1992, 94) even asserts that "no society can continue to exist, or �survive in the long run, without morality."

Predicated upon responsibility and morality, an active and free-willed Muslim through �social interactions with other members of the ummat expresses his or her values of faith �and knowledge for the attainment of falah by realising the will of God. Virtuous �actions, which depart from true faith and knowledge, are the real actualisation of God’s �will. This clearly indicates that the virtuous actions themselves are the will of God. �However, the actions are not a matter of good actions per se, rather they may be �carried out by anyone, which indicates that Islam is a non-sectarian, non-racial, non-�doctrinal, and universal religion (Ali 1989, 155), and is based on Islamic ethics which �are expressed in the faith of "believing in God." ��By utilising freedom and intelligence, the acts of doing virtuous actions (which are �based on Islamic ethics) indeed have a definite consequence or destination in that the �doers and their society will attain felicity both in worldly life and hereafter (see Ali �1989; Nasr 1994). Freedom itself, which is manifested in the character of an �individual as an active agent, is the will of God. This implies that, firstly, an individual �is requested to be an autonomous and active agent who all at once is bound by his or �her responsibility in the form of applying and adhering to codes of ethics, say, the �Shari’ah; secondly, changes can only be made through knowledge. This means that �the active agent has full consciousness in continuously searching for the basic laws of �God, and predicated upon this, he or she may "translate" the laws into practical forms �or construct social order based upon the laws and then consciously obey the laws that �have been constructed; or in other words, the individual lets the laws of God determine �his or her life; thirdly, the changes are constantly undertaken towards attaining a better �condition, that is, the one which leads all members of society to the consciousness of �attaining falah (Ali 1989, 154; al-Faruqi 1992, 109). Even though the changes may be �made real and concrete, in terms of structure or social order (al-Faruqi 1992, 93-4) �they do not necessarily alienate or enslave society and its members as the purpose of �the changes itself is to emancipate individuals from "worshipping" other individuals, �organisations, and social structure towards worshipping God alone. This is in all �conscience the implication of faith in the oneness of God (tawhid) (see al-Faruqi �1992). Of course, this insight is distinctly different from the Marxian critical theory �which is also concerned with emancipation, but departs from the materialistic view (see �Burrell and Morgan 1979), the non-teleological and non-transcendental one, in the �sense that the theory is limited only to the worldly affairs. Fourthly, conflict may be �found in Muslim society, but it is not the expected reality (Ali 1989, 154, 1341), and so �is a stable condition (status quo). This is so, because the members of Muslim society, �as argued by Madjid (1987, 143) must continuously make an effort to develop and �increase religious appreciation through making explorations which will enrich their �experiences and strengthen their faith (see also Abdalati 1975; al-Faruqi 1992).

Thus, based on the above illustration, we have a clear insight into the fact that human �beings are, in essence, autonomous agents, but at the same time are determined agents, �in the sense that they are tied by their responsibility to abide by the codes of ethics. �Therefore, it seems to us that the presence of both voluntarism and determinism is �complementary (depending upon its context). It is not a dichotomy or something that �is mutually exclusive. This characteristic is similar to the altruistic and egoistic �characteristics of an individual; the existence of both is complementary (see Ba-Yunus �1991). And the existence of the nature of society, namely the "regulation" and "radical �change," as identified by social scientists, seems to be mutually inclusive in the view of �Shari’ah. Muslim society is regulated by Shari’ah, therefore, society, as argued by al-�Faruqi,��is ruled neither by its rules, nor by its people, the ruled. Both of them are under the �law. The ruler is a mere executor of the law. The rules ... are instruments of �instantiation of the law. The ummah [the Muslim society] is not a legislative �assembly; it does not make the law. Nor is the law an expression of the general will �of the people. The law is divine. It comes from God (1992, 92).

In applying the Shari’ah, it is possible to make a concrete social structure which is �based on the Shari’ah, but is utilised by changing the condition of Muslim society �towards the real worshippers of God. As well, predicated upon the aim of society, the �attainment of falah, the construction of (accounting) knowledge should be directed to �the goal (see Bashir 1986b; Mohd. Nor Wan Daud 1989; al-Faruqi 1992).

4. Complementary Nature of Nominalism and Realism:

The Ontological Assumptions for Constructing Shari’ate Accounting Knowledge�We have a common perception that an individual’s perspective is not necessarily the �same as that of others. It can be seen, for instance, in how the individual sees reality. �In social science, a nominalist sees that "the social world external to the individual �cognition is made up of nothing more than names, concepts and labels which are used �to structure reality" and are utilised "as artificial creations whose utility is based upon �their convenience for describing, making sense of, and negotiating the external world" �(Burrell and Morgan 1979, 4), while, in contrast, a realist views reality as "a real world �made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable structures" (Burrell and Morgan �1979, 4). For the realist, social reality exists independently of social actors and is "out �there" (Morgan and Smircich 1980); it is not something created by the individual �(Burrell and Morgan 1979, 4).

The work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) apparently simplifies the ontological �assumptions by presenting two extreme poles of thought, that is, nominalism and �realism, while Al-A’ali (1993) criticises both nominalism and realism as being only a �partial view of reality. Nominalism, according to him, assumes that individuals exist in reality and that through them, multiple realities can be perceived; that means that

realities cannot be seen comprehensively. It also assumes that individuals (in terms of, �for instance, human relations) decide the mode of their relationships with others and �neglect the impact of other existing elements, namely, the objective reality represented �in the traditions and culture of a given society (Al-A’ali 1993). Therefore, social �realities are studied in a partial way. With regard to realism, Al-A’ali (1993) argues that �society with its institutions and organisations does exist; social laws which are applied in �that society, are believed to rest upon a reciprocal basis and human relations are merely �viewed in a reciprocal relationship. Human relations, he goes on to argue, "are simply �a matter of action and reaction; the uniqueness of individuals has just been neglected �and underestimated" (Al-A’ali 1993, 488). Consequently, any social theory based on �this view will lack the ability to advance a holistic perspective of knowledge (Al-A’ali �1993; see also Bashir 1986a; 1986b; al-Faruqi 1992).

Unlike both nominalism and realism, an Islamic perspective, as asserted by Al-A’ali (1993), sees objective reality, realism, and subjective reality, based on nominalism, as �coexisting (see also al-Faruqi 1992; Arif 1987). However, the coexistence of these �sorts of realities is not, he argues, based on dualism, or a dichotomy, as it will �transgress an important teaching of Islam, that is, the concept of the complement. All �things, except God, according to Islamic perspective (see Ali 1989, 1363), are in twos; �the complementary sexes of plants, animals and humans; the altruistic and egoistic �characteristics of human beings; the material and spiritual matters of human beings; the �subtle forces of nature such as day and night, positive and negative electricity, forces of �attraction and repulsion, and other numerous opposites, all fulfil their functions �according to the wonderful purpose of God (Ali 1989, 1363). The arguments of �Dhaouadi (1993) more and more support our premise (of coexistence, or of �complement). He asserts that Islam does not accept any dualism (on all aspects of �human life), but rather recognises a convergence and a unity in diversity. This, �according to him, "is against the nature of things to split matter from spirit, as this �violates the most fundamental principle of Islam: oneness (tawhid)" (Dhaouadi 1993, �155; see also al-Faruqi 1992).

With regard to the issues of nominalism-realism, we have already noted that a �nominalist sees reality as nothing more than the ideas of individuals. It is rooted in the �tenets of German idealism and of the Kantian notion which takes the view that "the �ultimate reality of the universe is spiritual [idea] rather than material in nature" (Burrell �and Morgan 1979, 279). It is, of course, contradictory to the materialist view which �perceives that reality is tangible, concrete, hard, and exists outside of individuals’ minds �(Burrell and Morgan 1979, 326). Concerning the nominalist view, we can explain it by �departing from the perception of the nature of self. We have seen that the inner values �of the self, namely, faith and knowledge, are the very essential initiators of every action �of the self. Faith and knowledge may be seen as a complementary force to addressing, �for instance, a course of action. Every individual, according to Islam, has an inborn �belief in God, the strength of which depends upon how he or she utilises his or her �intelligence, and interacts with his or her environment. Thus, faith is merely convinced �through the use of intelligence - the knowledge of the individual. However, it should �be remembered that faith will be stronger when it and knowledge are actualised in �everyday life in the form of virtuous social actions (Abdalati 1975; Madjid 1987; al-�Faruqi 1992). Obviously, the spiritual dimension is the departing point and more �powerful than the materialistic one in their continuing dynamic interaction. However, �they are complementary with a preferential difference (Dhaouadi 1993).

Clearly actions emanate from the spiritual qualities of an individual. Certainly, the �spiritual qualities here are greatly different from the dominant and influential �perspective of knowledge which strictly detaches knowledge from religion (see Bashir �1986a). The spiritual qualities are not, we have to remember, mere ideas or �knowledge, rather they are the amalgamated spirit of knowledge and faith. Actions that �have been delivered by the individual are real in their consequences (Handel 1982). It �means that social realities which are constructed as the real consequences of actions by �the individual may be real, tangible and concrete, but they do not exist independently of �the individual or social actors. This view is transparently different from the realism �which regards social realities existing concretely and independently of their social actors �(Burrell and Morgan 1979; Hines 1989). They do not consist of the mental object of �experiences, neither of ideas as idealist thought, nor of sense data as many �phenomenalists thought; they are also not made up of minds, nor of something �ultimately spiritual (Devitt 1984). In the Shari’ate view, social realities are not �independent of their social actors; they are created by the social actors. This is, of �course, the consequence of the nature of human beings who by nature are free-willed.

To sum up, the coexistential nature of ontological assumptions looks like, to some �extent, the combination of the subjective idealism of Fichte (1762-1814), the follower �of Kant, and the objective idealism of Hegel (1770-1831). The subjective idealism is �rooted in the assumption that "individual consciousness is a continuously creative entity �generating a perpetual stream of ideas, concepts and perspectives through which a �world external to mind is created" (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 279). From this �perspective, the social world is seen as the projection of individual consciousness. It is �the externalisation of the individual’s experiences into a form of reality which in turn is �reflected back upon him or her, and through which he or she becomes conscious about �his or herself and his or her actions (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 280), while the �objective idealism of Hegel rests upon the perception that individuals are characterised �by a constant interplay between consciousness and its objectification in the external �social world. It believes that both consciousness and social reality are two sides of the �same reality; "they are locked in a dialectical relationship in which each defines and �influences the other" (Burrell and Morgan 1979, 280).

5. Revelation, Reason, and Reality: The Epistemological Foundations for Constructing Shari’ate Accounting Knowledge

We have discussed and seen the Islamic theory of being, ontology, as the complement �of nominalism and realism rooted respectively in the spiritual and material dimensions �of human beings. However, Islam, as argued by Dhaouadi (1993, 157), takes the view �that "the spiritual dimension is always more powerful than the materialistic one in their �continuing dynamic interaction (italics in the original)." Still consistent with it, the �Islamic epistemology departs from the spiritual dimension as well. It begins with the �premise of that all knowledge is originally God’s knowledge (Bashir 1986a). Not only �does God teach individuals, but also fastens the individuals with a spiritual rope. It is �virtually, according to Ragab (1993), the covenant between the individual and the �Creator which is made before the individual is born. When individuals are born and �grow up in the human environment, the environment will lead them to "either keep �their original spirituality (fitrah) intact or become forgetful of their God and His �covenant" (Ragab 1993, 15). However, God is the Most Gracious and Merciful; He �"sends messengers with scripture containing prescriptions on how to return, to �‘remember’ the original covenant" (Ragab 1993, 15; see also Bashir 1986a). With �regard to this, the individuals, based on their free-will, may immediately follow the �guidance or even discard it. For those who follow it, they will construct and utilise �knowledge as the means for salvation which implies that the more individuals have �knowledge, the more they believe in God, fear Him, and feel a closeness to Him �(Dhaouadi 1993). In contrast, other individuals may neglect to remember the spiritual �covenant; they "have no interest in salvation or in communicating with God" �(Dhaouadi 1993; 162), and are greatly interested in "exploring, understanding, and �explaining the phenomena under study as well as applying the accumulated knowledge �and science to the management of human affairs" (Dhaouadi 1993, 162) per se. As a result, the truth attained by their knowledge is limited to their senses and reason (Dhaouadi 1993).

To this end - to remember the spiritual covenant- God has equipped the individuals �with senses, reason (Bashir 1986a), and faith. It depends, again, on the individual’s �free-will whether to use them or not. The individual who consciously knows his or her �own true nature will utilise the instruments so as to know closely the Creator and to �keep intact his or her sacred and spiritual covenant. Up to this point, we can see clearly �that the purpose of knowledge in Islam is not for material aspects per se, rather it rests �on, and is the complement of, the breathed divine spirit which is superior to its clay �(material) counterpart (Dhaouadi 1993; Ragab 1993). With regard to this matter, �Dhaouadi (1993) interestingly argues that the goal of human knowledge must not be �confined to the materialistic aspect of the objects being studied, but rather the spiritual �side of the objects should also be studied. The spiritual dimension of knowledge, as �further agued by Dhaouadi, is the privileged means for Muslim scientists to �communicate with the divine world. Hence, the service of human knowledge, �according to the Islamic outlook, "must not be limited only to the management of �human affairs in this world, but must also serve as a means of contact, experience, and �ultimate divine salvation" (Dhaouadi 1993, 156; see also Brohi 1988).�

To do so, the marriage between religion and science (human knowledge), is the best �and most fitting way; but is it possible? The answer to the question, for modern �epistemology, the perspective of which is materialistic (Bashir 1986a; Winkel 1989; �Dhaouadi 1993; Ragab 1993), might be absolutely impossible; this is so, because��[r]eligion and science are separate and mutually exclusive realms of human thought, �presentation of which in the same context leads to misunderstanding of both �scientific theory and religious belief (Sperry 1988, 608-9).��the conflict between empirical science and religion is, and always has been, a conflict �between the pseudoscientific aspects of religion and the pseudoreligious aspects of �science. To the extent that science remains science and religion remains religion, no �conflict is possible (Wilber 1990, 35).

In this respect, Safi (1993, 466) points out that current scientific activity is indeed �motivated by the motives of utilitarianism, the emergence of which "in the western �tradition coincided with an increased emphasis on positivistic approaches and a decline �of interest in the transcendental." Not surprisingly, then, the modern scientific tradition �transparently claims that "religion is not a domain where reason is exercised" (Bashir �1986a, 74), rather it is "the domain of faith, where faith and reason, at times, be �mutually exclusive" (Bashir 1986a, 74).

For Islam, in contrast, there is no separation or conflict between faith (revelation) and �reason (see Bashir 1986a, 1986b; Dhaouadi 1993; Ragab 1993; Safi 1993). Dhaouadi �asserts��[t]here has been hardly any religious -science opposition, hostility, and division in the �Islamic tradition. The required cooperation in Islamic scientific and learned circles �between science and knowledge, which results in human reasoning (‘aql) on the one �hand, and divine and prophetic references (naql) on the other hand, are telling �illustrations of the unity and the harmony between the divine, the mystical, the �religious and the human, the tangible, and the profane. Islam does not accept �dualism, but rather sees a convergence and a unity in such diversity (1993, 155).

Hence, he maintains that knowledge, in the Islamic view, must be the outcome of the �interaction between revealed knowledge and human reason, and dialogue the spiritual �and materialistic dimensions. There must be no secularisation of it, that is, by �eliminating the spiritual, the divine, and metaphysical dimensions of knowledge. Bashir �(1986a, 74) even asserts that "religion is the domain where reason is exercised to its �fullest capacity." He further argues "reason is so extended, it will recognise its own �limitations, and admit of the existence of true, uncorrigible and infallible knowledge �which is obtainable from genuine and authentic messengers of God" (1986a, 75), that �is, revelation. Taking the same position, Safi argues that revelation will never �contradict reason; he opines that ��[t]he denial of revelation’s scientific validity cannot be attributed to the nature of the �revealed assertions or to the structure of revelation itself, for both reason and �revelation consist of transcendental and empirical assertions. Thus, it is safe to say �that the complete exclusion of revelation from the realm of science is not due to any �inherent contradictions between the universal elements of revelation and reason, but �can be attributed to the internal conflict between the western scientific movement and �the Christian church (1993, 468; see also Bashir 1986a).�

Having adopted the integration of these two realms (namely, revelation and reason, or �religion and science, or the spiritual and materialistic dimensions, or the transcendental �and empirical dimensions), revelation will unavoidably be the main source of �knowledge (Bashir 1986a; 1986b; Dhaouadi 1993; Ragab 1993; Safi 1993).

The existence of reason as the counterpart of revelation, as we have discussed above, �greatly emphasises the method of rationalising revelation which is transcendental and �sometimes is not even accessible to the five human senses. Besides this, the Islamic �epistemology might also be characterised by the complement between revelation and �the (social and natural) world which means that the sources of knowledge in Islam are �the revelation and the world (reality) (Idris 1987). With regard to this, Safi (1993) �points out that the justification for revelation can be found in empirical reality - the �world. However, it should be remembered that revelation (the Qur’an) itself is not a �book of science, rather it is a book of guidance. It conveys signs (ayat) for a given �phenomenon which takes "constant and recurring interpretation and systematization," �and needs "the process of thinking, contemplating, and rationalizing" to understand the �phenomenon (Safi 1993, 469). By so doing, the interconnectedness between �revelation and reality will be found (Safi 1993) which in turn will increase the �conviction of, or the belief in, the existence of God (see al-Faruqi 1992), and the truth �which is dispersed through His words (revelation) and His will which may be expressed �in the form of natural and social laws (see Nasr 1994).

As a consequence of this, the truth attained by this approach is much broader and more transcendental than the modern one. Moreover, there will never be found any real �contradiction, or ultimate contradiction (al-Faruqi 1992, 43) between the truth attained �through revelation and the one attained by the empirical and scientific approach. As �"God is the ultimate source of both fact [the reality] and revelation" (Bashir 1986a, 75; �see also al-Faruqi 1992, 45), "the dependency of empirical and transcendental �knowledge is not one-sided: it is reciprocal, for the truth of transcendental is �substantiated through their empirical manifestations" (Safi 1993, 466). However, if a �contradiction between revelation and reality is indeed found, something should happen �to the "thought" and "speech" of individuals (al-Faruqi 1992, 44). Hence, they need to �either review their understanding of revelation, or their rational and scientific findings, �or both (al-Faruqi 1992, 44; see also Ragab 1993).

Beyond all these, it is interesting to note, not only is Islam concerned with how knowledge is acquired and constructed, but also with the personality of the individuals �who seek and formulate that knowledge. As we have mentioned before, Islamic �epistemology begins with the belief that all knowledge is God’s knowledge which �implies that "true" and certain knowledge can be attained, besides the Islamic scientific �approach as we have discussed, by sharpening the individual’s psychological and �spiritual aptitude (Bashir 1986b). This is the method of enlightening the individual’s �faith and intelligence, and of constantly remembering his or her original and spiritual �covenant with God. By so doing the thought, and the construction and the application �of knowledge, of the individual will always be in the path of God’s will.

6.Shari’ate Accounting "Knowledge": Creating Tawhidic Social Reality

Having looked at the human nature and society, ontology and epistemology of Islam, �we have a clear illustration that knowledge, in the view of Islam, is not merely to serve �the management of human affairs as such, but is also the means of contact, experience, �and ultimate divine salvation (Dhaouadi 1993). All these things - the cognition of �human nature and society, ontology, and epistemology - are the distinct concepts of �Islam which inevitably result in certain knowledge with particular values - the Shari’ate �(Tawhidic) values.

The fundamental aim of the Shari’ate accounting knowledge is not only to reflect ethical reality in an "accurate" manner, but also to guide the creation of reality which is �based on the Shari’ate values. This sort of reality is unique as it is the one which binds �individuals to "divine networks" ("divine social laws") which also brings about self-�consciousness of the individuals to worship only God through obeying or living �harmoniously with the divine networks. This means that the Shari’ate accounting �knowledge consists of values which attempt to emancipate individuals from a false �reality, that is the reality which may enslave the individuals or may make them far from �their real nature as viceregent of God on earth whose duty is to disseminate mercy for �all creatures in the form of worship.

The emancipation is actually an essential feature of the Shari’ate accounting knowledge �since the nature of the individuals is actually that of autonomous agents who, however, �are responsible for their own actions. Freedom, in our view here, is an indispensable �need for the individuals to disseminate mercy (for example, doing good businesses, �caring for stakeholders’ and society’s interests, sustaining environtment, and the like) so �that the function of the individuals as viceregent of God is indeed actualised. The �implication of this is that there should be no exploitation or enslavement amongst �individuals in all aspects of life. This means that there would be a free and egalitarian �society which has self-consciousness that every member of the society has the same �duty (that is, to disseminate mercy) which is applied as an act of worshipping God. It �is the ideal reality which becomes the primary aim of the Shari’ate accounting �knowledge.

This is actually a web of social realities which has a powerful capability of entrapping �individuals (who live in its networks) within its control and influence. When the web �of social realities is socially constructed within, for instance, materialistic values per se, �then there is little doubt that individuals are under the influence of such values; and the �values will alienate them from their real human nature (fitrah). Similarly, when the �values are the "spiritual" ones per se, these values will also definitely estrange the �individuals from their fitrah.

Islam, with its fundamental divine law - Tawhid (the belief in the unity of God); "there is no god, but God" - comes to emancipate individuals from "incorrect" realities to real �realities and a real life. The first part of the phrase "there is no god" is a negation of �those realities, which may not be based on the values of divine law, are pseudo-�realities, or, pseudo-gods towards which they should not be enslaved. Individuals �should be free from them. However, when they have been totally free from the �pseudo-gods, they have to assert that God is the God; it is actually the second part of �the phrase "but God" which guides the individuals to their real nature. Viewing this �sacred proclamation, al-Faruqi asserts that,��Al tawhid [the recognition that there is no god but God] purged religion absolutely �clean of all doubt regarding the transcendence and unicity of the Godhead. Thereby, �it accomplished a double purpose: that of acknowledging God as sole Creator of the �universe, and that of equalizing all men as creatures of God, endowed with the same �essential qualities of creaturely humanity, with the same cosmic status.

To al tawhid belongs another aspect, namely, the axiological. To assert laa ilaaha �illaa Allah means that Allah (SWT) is the sole and ultimate value, that everything else �is only an instrument whose value depends upon God for its valueness, and whose �goodness is measured by its actualization of ultimate, divine goodness. It means that �God is the final end of all desire, that He is the one and only Master whose will is the �ought-to-be of all that is (1992, 161-2). �

Under this view, as further argued by al-Faruqi (1992, 162), individuals are precisely the servants whose vocation and destiny are only for the service of God, or for the fulfilment of the divine will; that is, the realisation of divine value in space and time.

7.Concluding Remarks�

Accounting may be viewed as a means of reflecting reality. When reality is constructed �in relation to ethical values, accounting should also be based upon the ethics. If not, �the reality will be reflected in other presentations and in turn will mislead those who are �interested in it.�

For a Muslim, ethics is Shari’ah. It is the divine law which guides all aspects of �Muslim life be it for mundane affairs or spiritual dealings, including the way of an �individual should think and act towards other individuals and things in his or her �everyday life. Believing in the Shari’ah as divine guidance, the Muslim tries to �internalise its values and express them in thinking activities and overt actions.

It is claimed that accounting knowledge (theory) is at best constructed through the �guidance of the Shari’ah. Thus, according to Shari’ate ethics, it should stand on the �concept of the complement of two things or more. From the ontological point of view, �for instance, there is no dualism or dichotomy between realism and nominalism; both �are mutually inclusive. And under the epistemological assumptions as well, there is not �any dualism between, for instance, revelation and reason, religion and knowledge �(science), spiritual and material, and revelation and the real world.

The primary aim of the Shari’ate accounting knowledge is actually to guide individuals �in creating Tawhidic realities which entrap members of a society in "divine networks" �and make them to be self-consciousness about their real nature as the viceregent of �God on earth whose duty is to disseminate mercy for all creatures in the form of �worship.*�

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